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Abstract
Background—In March of 2011, an earthquake struck Japan causing a tsunami that resulted in a 
radiological release from the damaged Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Surveillance for 
potential radiological and any iodine/iodide product exposures was initiated on the National 
Poison Data System (NPDS) to target public health messaging needs within the United States 
(US). Our objectives are to describe self-reported exposures to radiation, potassium iodide (KI) 
and other iodine/iodide products which occurred during the US federal response and discuss its 
public health impact.
Methods—All calls to poison centers associated with the Japan incident were identified from 
March 11, 2011 to April 18, 2011 in NPDS. Exposure, demographic and health outcome 
information were collected. Calls about reported radiation exposures and KI or other iodine/iodide 
product ingestions were then categorized with regard to exposure likelihood based on follow-up 
information obtained from the PC where each call originated. Reported exposures were 
subsequently classified as probable exposures (high likelihood of exposure), probable non-
exposures (low likelihood of exposure), and suspect exposure (unknown likelihood of exposure).
Results—We identified 400 calls to PCs associated with the incident, with 340 information 
requests (no exposure reported) and 60 reported exposures. The majority (n = 194; 57%) of the 
information requests mentioned one or more substances. Radiation was inquired about most 
frequently (n = 88; 45%), followed by KI (n = 86; 44%) and other iodine/iodide products (n = 47; 
24%). Of the 60 reported exposures, KI was reported most frequently (n = 25; 42%), followed by 
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radiation (n = 22; 37%) and other iodine/iodide products (n = 13; 22%). Among reported KI 
exposures, most were classified as probable exposures (n = 24; 96%); one was a probable non-
exposure. Among reported other iodine/iodide product exposures, most were probable exposures 
(n = 10, 77%) and the rest were suspect exposures (n = 3; 23%). The reported radiation exposures 
were classified as suspect exposures (n = 16, 73%) or probable non-exposures (n = 6; 27%). No 
radiation exposures were classified as probable exposures. A small number of the probable 
exposures to KI and other iodide/iodine products reported adverse signs or symptoms (n = 9; 
26%). The majority of probable exposures had no adverse outcomes (n = 28; 82%). These data 
identified a potential public health information gap regarding KI and other iodine/iodide products 
which was then addressed through public health messaging activities.
Conclusion—During the Japan incident response, surveillance activities using NPDS identified 
KI and other iodine/iodide products as potential public health concerns within the US, which 
guided CDC’s public health messaging and communication activities. Regional PCs can provide 
timely and additional information during a public health emergency to enhance data collected 
from surveillance activities, which in turn can be used to inform public health decision-making.
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Background
On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck Japan 45 miles east of the Oshika 
Peninsula of Tōhoku, leading to a tsunami that caused destruction along the coastal regions 
in its path. The earthquake and tsunami also damaged the Fukushima Daiichi power plant 
reactors, creating explosions that resulted in the subsequent release of radioactive material 
into the environment. This incident marked the world’s worst nuclear accident in 25 years 
and was given the highest severity rating of 7 on the International Nuclear Event Scale by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency.1 The last incident given this same rating occurred 
in 1986 in Chernobyl, Russia, when an explosion at a nuclear reactor resulted in an 
unintentional release of radioactive materials.
As the crisis unfolded, the US public health authorities (specifically for the west coast states) 
sought to address public concerns for radiological exposures from atmospheric plumes 
spreading across the Pacific Ocean and including the United States (US) citizens traveling 
from Japan. Poison Centers (PCs), state departments of health, and the CDC national hotline 
received inquiries about the effect of the radiation on residents and whether residents should 
take any pharmaceutical countermeasure for radiological prophylaxis. The extent of the 
radioactive release was not yet known and the US authorities including the CDC emergency 
operations center were interested in proactively identifying health communication needs and 
accurately targeting and evaluating risk communication messages as part of the public health 
response. In particular, authorities were interested in tracking individual potential exposures 
to potassium iodide (KI) and other iodide products consumed as pharmaceutical 
countermeasures for radioactive iodine and other potential radiological exposures. Past 
incidents involving uncontrolled radiological release such as the Chernobyl reactor accident 
showed that prophylaxis using potassium iodide and other iodide containing products can 
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result in adverse reactions including abdominal pain, vomiting, skin rashes, and in some rare 
cases an exacerbation of chronic obstructive lung disease.2 For the Japan incident, the public 
health recommendation was not to take KI or any other pharmaceutical countermeasures for 
the US. However, there was a perceived risk and fear of radiological poisoning from this 
event by the public. To assess and identify health communication needs related to the 
incident for the US residents, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the 
American Association of Poison Control Centers (AAPCC) rapidly identified calls made to 
poison centers regarding potential exposures to radiation or radiological contamination, 
potassium iodide, and other iodine/iodide products associated with the Japan incident using 
the National Poison Data System (NPDS).
NPDS is a data repository and web-based public health (PH) surveillance system owned and 
operated by the AAPCC. It consists of data collected and uploaded from calls to the 57 
contributing, regional PCs regarding potential exposures to chemicals and poisons. These 
PCs provide 24-hour clinical consultation and triage by phone to the public and to healthcare 
facilities and respond to information requests regarding chemical and poison exposures to 
anyone in the 50 United States (US), District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands, 
the Federated States of Micronesia, American Samoa, and Guam. Since 2003, the National 
Center for Environmental Health (CDC) has used NPDS to improve PH surveillance for 
chemical and poison exposures and illnesses by identifying early markers of chemical 
incident for a rapid and appropriate PH response, and finding potential cases of public health 
significance to enhance situational awareness during an emerging public health incident.3 
Previous successful examples of this last objective include surveillance for chemical and oil 
exposures from the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, cases of illness associated with a 2009 
Salmonella outbreak from peanut butter, and carbon monoxide poisonings resulting from 
generator use after numerous hurricanes.4 Our objectives are to describe the self-reported 
exposures to radiation, radioactive materials, KI and other iodine/iodide product exposures 




Analysis of ongoing poison center data surveillance was conducted during the activation of 
the CDC emergency operations center from March 11, 2011 to April 18, 2011. The NPDS 
surveillance team consisted of clinical toxicologists and epidemiologists from both CDC and 
AAPCC. AAPCC disseminated an incident-specific code for all PCs to use whenever a 
caller reports an exposure or requests information about the Japan incident. Using this 
incident specific code, the team identified, classified, and analyzed all calls to PCs 
associated with the Japan incident daily on the basis of the reason for the call: a simple 
request for information and no hazardous exposure (information call) or a request for 
guidance on how to manage a possible hazardous exposure (reported exposure). All calls 
were also identified by the state where the call originated, caller location (primary residence 
or healthcare facility), and if one of the following was the reason for the call: unintentional 
radiological exposure, intentional KI ingestion, or other iodine/iodide product ingestion. For 
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all reported exposure calls, team members contacted the appropriate regional PC to request 
any additional information not reported to NPDS (sometimes entered in a free text field and 
stored on the local PCs server as the call narrative) and reviewed these data to categorize the 
reported exposure calls as probable exposures, probable non-exposures, or suspect 
exposures. The categorization scheme based on the reported exposure is detailed in Table 1. 
Individuals in which additional narrative data suggest an actual KI or other iodine/iodide 
product ingestion were classified as probable ingestions of that product. Alternatively, 
reported ingestions in which additional narrative data suggest that the ingestion did not 
occur were classified as probable non-exposures.
Any reported ingestion that upon additional narrative data review still cannot determine 
whether an actual ingestion occurred is classified as a suspect exposure. For radiation, 
individuals who reported a radiological exposure but had no travel to or from Japan during 
the response period were categorized as probable non-exposures. Persons reporting a 
radiological exposure who had traveled to or from Japan during the response period were 
categorized as suspect exposures due to the absence of environmental or laboratory testing 
data available to confirm exposure.
For all KI and other iodide product ingestions classified as probable exposures, clinical 
outcome, clinical effects contained in NPDS as pre-existing options (131 pre-coded clinical 
signs, symptoms and laboratory abnormalities) and patient demographics were tabulated, 
stratified by substance of interest. Clinical outcomes were classified by the severity of the 
clinical effects. Where the patient exhibits only some symptoms as a result of the exposure 
and which are minimally bothersome to the patient is defined as Minor effect. Moderate 
effect is defined as the patient exhibiting symptoms as a result of the exposure which are 
more pronounced or more prolonged than minor symptoms. Data and their interpretation 
were shared daily with the CDC emergency operations center managing the response.
Results
Between March 11 and April 18, 340 (85%) requests for information and 60 (15%) potential 
exposures to the substances of interest were captured by PCs and identified as associated 
with the Japan incident. Fig. 1 shows the daily call volume for the incident. The highest 
volume of calls originated from the west coast states including California (n = 161; 40%), 
Washington (n = 48; 12%), and Oregon (n = 19; 5%).
Of the 340 information calls, most (n = 229; 67%) came from a residence, followed by 
unknown sites (n = 97; 29%), and a healthcare facility (n = 14; 4%). The majority (n = 194; 
57%) of the information calls mentioned a specific substance or more than one substance. 
Among these, radiation (n = 88; 45%) was reported most frequently, followed by KI (n = 86; 
44%), and other iodine/iodide products (n = 47; 24%).
Of the 60 reported exposures, the majority (n = 54; 84%) came from a residence, a smaller 
number (n = 8; 13%) from a healthcare facility, and the rest were unknown (n = 2; 3%). Of 
the reported exposures, KI (n = 25; 42%) was reported most frequently, followed by 
radiation (n = 22; 37%), and other iodine/iodide products (n = 13; 22%).
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Of the 25 reported KI exposures, most were classified as probable ingestions (n = 24; 96%) 
and one was classified as a probable non-exposure. Of the 13 reported other iodide/iodine 
product ingestions, most were classified as probable ingestions (n = 10, 77%) and the rest 
were suspect exposures (n = 3; 23%). Of the 22 reported radiation exposures, most were 
classified as suspect exposures (n = 16, 73%) and the rest (n = 6; 27%) were classified as 
probable non-exposures. None of the radiation exposures were classified as probable 
exposures (Table 2).
Of the 34 probable exposures, all involved KI (n = 24; 71%) or other iodine/iodide products 
(n = 10; 29%). Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of the probable exposures. Most 
involved females (n = 21; 62%) and most were greater than 20 years of age (n = 22; 65%). 
Only a small portion of all the probable exposures (n = 9; 26%) reported any signs or 
symptoms from the exposure. Of these 9 probable exposures reporting signs and symptoms, 
5 were from other iodide/iodine products and 4 were from KI. The most commonly reported 
signs or symptoms included nausea (n = 2), vomiting (n = 2), dizziness/vertigo (n = 2), and 
abdominal pain (n = 2).
Discussion
Following a radiological or nuclear event, radioactive iodine may be released into the air. 
When radioactive materials get into the body through breathing, eating, or drinking, internal 
contamination occurs. In the case of internal contamination with radioactive iodine, the 
thyroid gland quickly absorbs this chemical. Radioactive iodine absorbed by the thyroid can 
then injure the gland. Because non-radioactive KI acts to block radioactive iodine from 
being taken into the thyroid gland, it can help protect this gland from injury.5
Pharmacotherapy with KI or any other iodine/iodide product for radioactive iodine exposure 
was never indicated or recommended for US residents.5 However, surveillance efforts 
identified intentional ingestions of KI and other iodide products due to the perceived risk of 
the incident as a potential public health issue. The majority of the probable KI exposures 
were callers who had ingested KI tablets and were inquiring whether the dosage would lead 
to iodine poisoning. Even though there were very few adverse effects reported with these 
probable KI ingestions, the clinical effect patterns were similar to those reported after mass 
prophylaxis with KI in Poland during the Chernobyl reactor accident.2 CDC also identified 
10 probable exposures to various iodine/iodide products such as kelp and imported iodide-
containing products such as “Rabano Yodado”, a Mexican nutritional supplement containing 
KI and tincture of iodine.
The perceived risk to health from this incident by US citizens calling PCs for information 
affirmed the need for effective health messaging against taking KI and against taking any 
iodine/iodide product that is advertised for radioactive iodine prophylaxis. Early review of 
various information sources such as calls to the CDC hotline and hits to the CDC website by 
communications staff indicated that individuals were actively seeking information about KI 
and its use. The NPDS data validated reports from these sources and substantiated the need 
for specific health information to address both the perception of risks associated with the 
incident and the actual risks associated with unnecessary consumption of KI and other 
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iodine/iodide products. This need drove CDC’s initial health messaging in response to the 
incident, which included the primary development of informational materials about KI, as 
well as its pharmacological action, efficacy, and contraindications. Much of this information 
was already available in the CDC website, but specific messaging and FAQs focusing on the 
incident was crafted and disseminated for PC and federal, state and local public health use. 
This ensured consistent and accurate messaging to address public concerns, regardless of the 
public health agency or PC responding to the inquiry.
The decline in all PC calls on March 17th and 18th as seen in Fig. 1 occurred after CDC had 
disseminated health messages that better characterized the risks associated with the incident 
and addressed public concerns about KI and radiological contamination. This decline in calls 
coincided with other decreases in information-seeking behavior as measured by CDC 
website traffic, public inquiries, and media inquiries. Consequently, these information 
sources suggested that the information needs of the public for this incident were being met 
by federal, state and local public health programs and PCs. Together, these factors 
influenced CDC’s evolving risk communication strategy which shifted from addressing 
public perceptions about radiation risk and the prophylactic use of KI to messages that 
focused on issues directly linked to the unfolding events, such as airport screening and 
environmental testing results.
Further categorization of radiation exposure calls proved difficult upon review of the limited 
information obtained directly from PCs. In the absence of objective radiological screening in 
the individual or the environment of the exposed individual, CDC could not determine 
which, if any, were likely to be probable exposure to radiation or radioactive contamination. 
As such, no exposures were categorized as probable exposures. For preparedness in future 
radiation incidents, a standardized response by PC staff to potential radiation or radiological 
exposures should be considered to ensure that any objective screening, possibly available 
through community reception centers or other population monitoring stations, are 
documented.
This event response demonstrated that the NPDS surveillance team could report beyond the 
total number of calls about an incident as it had been used in previous events by CDC. 
Individual PCs can be contacted for additional information to be used by the team to further 
classify the likelihood of exposure. This process can be replicated for future event responses 
as needed and even expanded upon. Software changes that give coding options which allow 
rapid exposure classification and confirmation at the PC level would enable NPDS users to 
automatically classify calls as suspect, probable or confirmed exposures. If a reported 
exposure could be classified sooner, then NPDS users can, based on the presence and 
absence of clinically compatible illness, use case definitions for reporting. This report 
represents the next step in the continuous evolution of NPDS as a surveillance system.
Limitations
Individual and regional PC utilization varies across the country; therefore, calls to PCs may 
not include all potential exposures or requests for information associated with the incident. 
Although the true exposure incidence to hazardous substances is unknown, the Institute of 
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Medicine estimates that total exposure calls underreport the incidence of true poisonings by 
half.6 During public health incidents such as the Japan response, media coverage of the 
incident or advertising of the PC toll-free number can significantly influence call volume. 
Constant media coverage may have resulted in an increased volume of calls.
Because calls to PCs are self-reported, reported exposures may not be true exposures. 
Callers that falsify information to report an exposure would be categorized in the analysis 
like any actual exposure, although there is little evidence that these instances occur often. 
Further review of PC case notes can filter out caller scenarios where the exposure likely did 
not occur, but this process cannot definitively confirm or deny an exposure.
NPDS identifies substances of exposure by a predetermined list of all possible exposure 
substances compiled by a third party. These substance names are extremely specific, 
updated regularly, and were used effectively to identify KI and other iodine/iodide product 
exposures during the response. However, the current substance list related to radiation or 
radioactive materials is outdated, and as a result many of the incident-related radiation 
exposure calls had little detail beyond just a reported exposure to “radiation”. The NPDS 
surveillance team was only able to identify whether an individual reported exposure to 
radiation, but was not able to discern any reported radiation dose or radioactive material 
involved in the potential exposure or contamination. Review of the case notes often included 
some information of the isotope and dose that was otherwise not in NPDS, but oftentimes 
this information was not mentioned at all. Even though the majority of calls to PCs 
originates from a residence and is thus unlikely to have the specific dose and isotope of the 
radiation exposure, the NPDS team recommends that PCs have tools available to accurately 
identify radiation calls in case a domestic radiation incident occurs and detailed information 
is available through environmental or population monitoring stations. This incident 
highlighted the need for a revision of the current radiation-related substances list to increase 
the detail of radiation exposure call information in NPDS.
Conclusion
Surveillance activities using the NPDS identified intentional ingestions of KI and other 
iodine/iodide products as a potential public health concern within the US during the Japan 
incident response. This guided CDC’s public health messaging and communication activities 
with timely information for an appropriate response. Regional PCs can provide timely 
information during a public health emergency to enhance data collected from surveillance 
activities, which in turn can be used to inform public health decision-making. Surveillance 
using NPDS demonstrated utility for conducting human health effects and exposure 
surveillance to assess perceived and actual risk associated with a known public health 
emergency.
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Daily volume of calls to PCs associated with the Japan incident from March 11 to April 18, 
2011 (N = 400). (colour version of this figure can be found in the online version at 
www.informahealthcare.com/ctx).
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Table 1
Exposure call categorization scheme by substance.
Substance Probable exposure Probable non-exposure Suspect exposure
Potassium Iodide (KI)
 ingestions
Reported exposure to potassium
 iodide in which PC follow up
 via review of the call narrative
 suggests that an ingestion of KI
 containing product occurred.
Reported exposure to potassium
 iodide in which PC follow up
 via review of the call narrative
 suggests that an ingestion of
 KI containing product did not
 occur. Example: individual opens
 KI bottle and gets light-headed
 without ingesting any tablets
Any reported exposure that upon PC
 follow up via review of the call
 narrative still cannot determine
 whether an actual exposure
 occurred.
Other iodine or iodide
 product ingestions
Reported exposure to other iodine/
 iodide products in which PC
 follow up via review of the call
 narrative suggests that an 
ingestion
 of such product occurred.
Reported exposure to other iodine/
 iodide products in which PC
 follow up via review of the call
 narrative suggests that an ingestion
 of such products did not occur.
Any reported exposure that upon PC
 follow up via review of the call
 narrative still cannot determine
 whether an actual exposure
 occurred.
Radiological exposures Reported exposure to radiation or
 radioactive material in which
 PC follow up via review of the
 call narrative strongly suggests
 that radiation exposure or
 contamination occurred, including
 documented travel to Japan,
 radiation measurements of the
 exposed individual, urine assay
 test results, and/or additional
 examinations.
Reported exposure to radiation or
 radioactive material in which PC
 follow up via review of the call
 narrative suggests that radiation
 exposure or contamination did not
 occur. Exposed individuals who
 did not report any travel to or from
 Japan since March 11, 2011 are
 classified in this category.
Any reported exposure that PC
 follow up via review of the call
 narrative still cannot determine
 whether an actual exposure or
 contamination occurred. Exposed
 individuals who reported travel
 to or from Japan since March
 11, 2011 but have no objective
 evidence of a true radiation
 exposure or contamination
 (radiation measurements, urine
 assay test results, and/or 
additional
 examinations).
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Table 2







Potassium Iodide ingestions 24 1 0 25
Other iodine/iodide product ingestions 10 0 3 13
Unintentional radiological exposures 0 6 16 22
Total 34 7 23 60
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Table 3
Descriptive characteristics of probable ingestions of KI and other Iodide products associated with the Japan 
incident, 11 March – 18 April 2011 (N = 34).
Characteristic N (%)
Sex
 Male 13 (38)
 Female 20 (59)
 Unknown 1 (3)
Age
 0–10 years 6 (18)
 10–20 years 6 (18)
 > 20 years 22 (65)
Outcomes
 Moderate effect 1 (3)
 Minor effect 0 (0)
 No effect/not followed 28 (82)
 Unrelated effect 4 (12)
 Unknown/unable to follow up 1 (3)
Most common clinical effects
 Nausea 2 (6)
 Vomiting 2 (6)
 Dizziness/vertigo 2 (6)
 Abdominal pain 2 (6)
 Agitated/irritable 1 (3)
 Oral irritation 1 (3)
 Rash 1 (3)
 Tachycardia 1 (3)
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